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State Embargo of Solid Waste: Impermis-
sible Isolation or Rational Solution
to a Pressing Problem?
I. Introduction
The productive activities of man have always generated waste.' The
current realization that growth must coexist with the constraint of a finite
supply of resources and that environmental pollution often returns to
haunt the polluter has transformed the age-old phenomenon of waste into
a problem. 2 The combination of population growth and increasing con-
centration in urban areas with changes in packaging and marketing
techniques designed to attract consumers has created a crisis for govern-
mental units that are responsible for the disposal of solid waste.3 Ten
1. For the purpose of the following constitutional analysis, solid waste may be
defined as
garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, com-
mercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but
does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or
dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are
point sources subject to permits under section 1342 of Title 33, or source, special
nuclear or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended (68 Stat. 923).
Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 1004, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(27) (West 1977).
2. For a discussion of pertinent facts outlining the magnitude of the problem, see
H.R. REP. No. 94-1461 - PART II, 94th Cong., 2d Se.ss. (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG, & AD. Naws 6323, 6323-27.
3. It is ironic that progress in technology and environmental control has aggravated
the solid waste problem. Refuse production is increasing at a rate faster than population
growth because modem packaging, which is geared to an affluent society, has created a
generation of throw-away containers and planned obsolescence. Disposal technology has
not kept pace with the increasing volume of trash. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a) (I), (b)(3) (West
1977); J. PAVONI, J. HEER & D. HAGERTY, HANDBOOK OF SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL 2 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as'HANDBOOK].
Simultaneously, stringent air and water pollution controls have reduced the quantity of
solid matter that may be disposed of by incineration or dumping in the ocean. Because urban
areas rely on these two methods of disposal and because refuse accumulates near the
source, the problem is especially acute in cities. The Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-44 (Supp. II 1972), as amended by Act of March
22, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50 (1974), prohibits the dumping of material unless a
permit is first obtained from the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
The Administrator must determine "that such dumping will not unreasonably degrade or
endanger human health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological
systems, or economic potentialities." 33 U.S.C. § 1412(b) (Supp. II. 1972). The Environ-
mental Protection Agency has conditioned the issuance of interim permits for dumping toxic
waste into the ocean on either the establishment of land based disposal projects or the
reduction in toxicity of waste components dumped in the ocean. 40 C.F.R. § 220-227
(1976).
states4 have responded with legislation that bans, subject to various
qualifications, any waste collected in other states from final disposal
within their borders. The erection of barriers against interstate transporta-
tion of waste raises a question of whether such state action conflicts with
either federal legislation or the national interest in the unhampered move-
ment of goods across state lines.
Congress has not attempted to impose a framework of pervasive
control in the field of solid waste management because it recognizes the
uniquely local character of the problem.' Congress has adopted a differ-
ent viewpoint regarding the recovery of material and energy resources
from waste. 6 The judicial resolution of whether the prohibition against
waste from other states offends the commerce clause depends on a
balancing of the state interest in conserving the health and resources of its
citizens against the burden imposed on commerce. 7 A state statute that
accommodates the immediate local interest in preserving health and land
resources with the long range national policy of recovering resources
from waste will survive a constitutional challenge.
8
A legal analysis of solutions to the solid waste problem must recog-
nize that waste is not a homogeneous substance. 9 Materials that are
renewable, such as paper, metal and glass, must be distinguished from
those that have no further value, such as plastic containers and organic
waste.'1 The distinction is important for both the determination of
whether solid waste is entitled to protection under the commerce clause
The Federal Ocean Dumping Act effectively cuts off the ocean as a medium of disposal
for the many coastal cities experiencing an increasing rate of solid waste generation but a
decreasing availability of land disposal sites. For the impact of the permit system on
Philadelphia's ocean disposal program, see 5 ENVIR. L. REP. 10144 (1975).
Landfill, the remaining disposal option, can cause water pollution if the leachate enters
undergound waters or air pollution if the landfill generates odors or flammable methane. See
note 140 infra. Also, if there is not a sufficient quantity of low cost land nearby, hauling
charges will eventually equal the large initial outlay of capital necessary to construct an
urban incinerator. HANDBOOK, supra at 3.
4. The states with exclusionary statutes are Delaware, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
See notes 147-65 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of these statutes.
5. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
6. See note 23 and accompanying text infra.
7. See note 79 and accompanying text infra.
8. See notes 147-59 and accompanying text infra.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. Organic wastes provide an excellent illustration of why the solution to the solid
waste problem depends on advances in technology. For those communities that routinely
bury their garbage, waste merely accelerates the depletion of available land resources. In
contrast, Combustion Power Company, in California, has developed an incinerator that
converts solid waste into electricity. Municipal wastes are an excellent fuel, with one-third
the heating value of a good grade coal, but without the high sulphur content. The CPU-400
generator disposes of all the municipality's solid waste, delivers ten percent of local power
requirements, and recovers valuable materials in the incinerator residue. I F. GRAD, TREAT-
ISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, § 4.01, at 12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GRAD]. The major
limitation on a widespread application of energy recovery incinerators is the large quantity
of waste needed to make the site economically feasible. Operation of these generators will
necessarily be restricted to densely populated areas. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALI-
TY, SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT 56, 57 (1976). See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
and whether congressional action preempts state legislation. Federal
statutes on the subject evidence a recognition that the disposal of refuse is
primarily a local concern, but that the recycling of materials and energy
contained in waste matter is a subject matter ripe for national control.
Finally, the statutes of Louisiana," Maine,' 2 Massachusetts,' 3 and New
Hampshire 14 explicitly exempt waste matter intended for use as raw
material for the production of new commodities from the blanket prohibi-
tion against importing solid waste.
II. Preemption
The first hurdle a state statute that regulates the movement of solid
waste in commerce must overcome is preclusion by federal legislation.
Because solid waste management had been a matter of exclusive local
interest until the passage of the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,'5
federal regulation on the subject must be scrutinized closely. The intent of
Congress to supersede state action in an area traditionally reserved to the
police power of the state must be clearly manifest. 16 Courts that have
analyzed the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 have unanimously held
there was no preemption intended.' 7 The impact of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act of 1976,18 which became law on October 21,
1976 and substantially amended the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,
has not been judicially determined.' 9
11. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299.36 B (West Supp. 1977).
12. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (Supp. 1976).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 17A (West Supp. 1977). (The recycling program
must process at least sixty percent of the refuse and the remainder may not be deposited
without the approval of the local governing body).
14. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147:30f (Supp. 1973).
15. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59 (1965).
16. "[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); accord, Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 11 (1937). But see City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411
U.S. 624 (1973), for an example of federal preemption in the area of noise regulation,
traditionally a concern of local governments. The Court, in considering local regulation of
airport noise was persuaded by the pervasiveness of federal regulation:
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about in the sky
like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, subject to federal
inspection, in the hands of federally certified personnel and under an intricate
system of federal commands. The moment a ship taxis onto a runway it is caught
up in an elaborate and detailed system of controls.
Id. at 633-34 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 332 U.S. 293, 303 (1944)). This
degree of federal control is not present in the area of solid waste management.
17. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 699 (Or. Ct.
App. 1973); Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
68 N.J. 451, 471, 348 A.2d 505, 515 (1975).
18. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901-87 (West 1977).
19. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Hackensack Meadowlands Dev.
Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975), involved a
joint review of two separate cases, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, in which judgment was
entered upon an oral opinion, and Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n. v. Municipal
Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (1974), in which the H.M.D.C.
sought to enjoin a landfill from accepting any waste for disposal that originated outside the
State's borders. Both lower court opinions held that the New Jersey exclusionary statute
A. Federal Statutes
The course of federal legislation since 1965 in the area of solid waste
reveals a growing federal involvement in the mechanics of solid waste
management. Generally there has been a convergence of authority in the
federal sphere over the recovery of materials and energy from waste, but
the choice of methods applied to collection and disposal has remained
within the province of state power. The separability of disposal processes
from resource recovery will largely determine how much authority states
will retain.
1. The Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965.-The Solid Waste
Disposal Act 20 contained the explicit congressional finding that
while the collection and disposal of solid wastes should con-
tinue to be primarily the function of the State, -regional, and
local agencies, the problems of waste disposal as set forth
above have become a matter national in scope and in concern
and necessitate Federal action through financial and technical
assistance and leadership in development, demonstration, and
application of new and improved methods and processes to
reduce the amount of waste and unsalvageable materials and to
provide for proper and economical solid-waste disposal prac-
tices.2
The national role was restricted to sponsoring a research and development
program aimed at updating the lagging technology of waste disposal.22
2. The Resource Recovery Act of 1970.-The 1970 amendments
to the Solid Waste Disposal Act shifted the national focus from data-
gathering to developing the technology necessary to recover materials and
energy from discarded waste. The Resource Recovery Act was founded
on a much stronger national concern for conservation and therefore the
Environmental Protection Agency assumed a more active leadership role
was an unconstitutional attempt to conserve a local natural resource because its purpose
was accomplished by discrimination based on the source of the refuse. The New Jersey
Supreme Court rejected the economic discrimination argument and found that the statute
was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power to protect the health and safety of its
citizens.
The United States Supreme Court in Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977), a
per curiam opinion, declined to decide the case on the issues raised in the lower courts.
Instead, the Court vacated the New Jersey court's determination that exclusion was con-
stitutional and remanded the case for a reconsideration of the preemption issue in light of
the newly enacted Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. Four dissenting Justices
believed an examination of the Act's legislative history indicated the intent to preempt state
action was clearly absent. The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce has
stated,
It is the Committee's intention that federal assistance should be an incentive
for state and local authorities to act to solve the discarded materials problem. At
this time federal preemption of this problem is undesirable, inefficient, and damag-
ing to local initiative.
Id. at 143.
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-59 (1965).
21. Id. § 3251(a)(6) (965); 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a)(4) (West 1977).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3253 (1965).
in the management of waste control.23 Although Congress expressed a
national policy to promote regional cooperation in the Solid Waste Dis-
posal Act,2 4 the method of enforcing this interest was restricted to
economic incentives rather than the direct imposition of standards. The
obligation to coordinate planning activities with other related government
agencies attached to the grants in sections 3254(a) to 3254(f) was entirely
voluntary; a state could choose to ignore the requirement of intergovern-
mental cooperation by rejecting federal funds.
3. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.-The 1976
amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act 25 continue the policy of
furthering federal objectives through financial incentives.
(a) State or regional solid waste plans.-Federal assistance for
waste management is contingent on the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy's approval of a state plan 26 that conforms to the requirements of
section 6943. The objectives of the state plans are "to assist in devel-
oping and encouraging methods for the disposal of solid waste which are
environmentally sound and which maximize the utilization of valuable
resources and to encourage resource conservation.'"27 The seed for ex-
pansion of federal control is contained in the EPA Administrator's author-
ity to establish guidelines for the identification of solid waste manage-
ment regions and for state plans.
28
Because "region" has never been concretely defined in any federal
legislation concerned with solid waste, there is only a potential conflict
between a state's exclusion of foreign waste and the Administrator's
prerogative to establish regions irrespective of sovereign state bound-
aries. Section 6942(c) lists the major elements to be considered in estab-
lishing regions. Generally the region must be large enough to incorporate
advanced technology and high cost disposal equipment, but it is limited in
size by transportation costs and geographic, geological, climatic, and
23. The change in purpose is clearly illustrated in the 1970 amendments to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3251(b) and 3253(a), which emphasized the recovery of material and energy in addition to
the processing of waste. The National Materials Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-512, §§
201-206, further evidences the national policy to "utilize present resources and technology
more efficiently, to anticipate the future materials requirements of the nation and the world,
and to make recommendations on the supply, use, recovery, and disposal of materials." Id.
§ 202. The function of the National Commission on Materials Policy was to investigate
national materials requirements and to recommend the development of materials that are
susceptible to recycling, reuse, or self-destruction. See also National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(6) (1970).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 3254 (1970).
25. 42 U.S.C.A. 88 6901-87 (West 1977).
26. Id. § 6947.
27. Id. § 6941.
28. Id. § 6942. The difference in scope between the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and the earlier Resource Recovery Act becomes apparent by comparing the
subject matter of the guidelines. The Resource Recovery Act limited EPA oversight to
recovery, collection, separation, and disposal systems-the physical methods of disposal.
42 U.S.C. §§ 3254C, 3251(b)(4) (1970). The 1976 Act allows the EPA to set guidelines for the
basic unit of waste management itself.
hydrologic characteristics. In the field of waste disposal there are no
analogies to water or air basins because domestic and commercial waste
is uniform in composition. There is also a basic difference between air
and water pollutants, which are ambient and respect no political bound-
aries, and solid waste, which is stationary. Therefore, the drawing of
regions is entirely arbitrary, provided the disposal site, whether an in-
cinerator or a landfill, is located near the largest concentration of waste. 29
The requirement of regional planning can coexist with the sanctity of state
boundaries. 30 Pursuant to the guidelines in section 6942(c), a state may
establish regions that are contained within its boundaries and exclude out-
of-state waste without violating the provisions for state plans. 3'
Section 6946(a) allocates the task of carving out regions to the
governor of each state guided only by the objective criteria of urban
concentrations, geographic conditions, and the existence of disposal and
resource recovery markets. Section 6946(c) expressly permits interstate
cooperation, but does not make it requisite to a plan's acceptability. In
fact, section 6942(c)(9) indicates that operational difficulties caused by
political subdivisions militate against interstate regions.
(b) Guidelines and regulations.-Although a state may avoid the
above guidelines and requirements of regional solid waste plans by
simply failing to meet the minimum requirements, the guidelines for solid
waste management authorized by section 6907 are of general application
and are not attached to any state plan. Within one year the Administrator
must provide a comparative analysis of available solid waste management
practices 32 and within two years must establish levels of performance that
adequately safeguard the public health and welfare, the environment, and
aesthetic standards.33 Guidelines may also include information pertinent
to choosing an adequate location, design, and construction of solid waste
disposal facilities. The most substantial departure from past legislation is
the authorization to prescribe regulations that are necessary to carry out
29. Economic theory suggests that a regional approach is the least-cost alternative if
the region is sufficiently well-defined. Increased collection costs from the greater volume of
waste transported over longer distances must be offset by increased disposal economies
from larger, more efficient facilities. The goal in planning a region is to minimize the
transportation costs. K. CLAYTON & J. HuIE, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT (1973); GRAD,
supra note 10, § 4.01, at 21.
30: For an example of a regional recycling program operating wholly within one state,
see WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 499.01-.55 (West Supp. 1976). The statutory scheme has already
survived a constitutional challenge. Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Auth. v. Earl, 70 Wis.
2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975). (Note especially the legislative findings, 70 Wis. 2d at 479-
80, 235 N.W.2d at 658).
31. The Oregon Court of Appeals in American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Or. Ct. App. 1973), in discussing the preemption issue, discovered in
federal environmental legislation a congressional policy favoring the states' exercise of their
own authority over the environment. Id. at 699. This federal policy would lend support to a
state's decision to manage regions only within its own borders.
32. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6907(a)(1) (West 1977).
33. Id. § 6907(a)(2).
the functions of the Administrator.3 4 As the dissent in Philadelphia v.
New Jersey35 noted, it is impossible to foretell whether this power will be
used as a carrot or a stick, but the consequences for exclusionary state
statutes may be a direct conflict with EPA regulations.
36
(c) Analysis.-To determine whether the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act of 197637 precludes state embargoes of solid waste, it
is necessary to examine "[tihe nature of the power exerted by Congress,
the object sought to be obtained, and the character of the obligations
imposed by the law .. ".. ,38 The primary objective of the Act is to
conserve valuable material and energy resources3 9 by ending existing
disposal practices that pose a danger to the environment or health and
encouraging the development of improved solid waste management and
resource conservation techniques. Cooperation among federal, state, and
local governments and private enterprise is necessary to achieve this
objective of material and energy recovery. 
40
To meet these objectives, the Administrator is empowered to pro-
mulgate guidelines and regulations for solid waste management. The
standards applicable to hazardous wastes are minimum requirements, 4'
34. Id. § 6912(a)(1).
35. 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
36. In brief, EPA's position is that a State importation ban such as that enacted
by New Jersey is in conflict with the national policy set forth in Section 206 of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act, the administration of which law is an EPA responsibili-
ty. The EPA Administrator is charged with encouraging (1) cooperative activities
by the States and local governments in connection with solid waste disposal
programs; (2) interstate, inter-local, and regional planning for, and the conduct of,
interstate, inter-local and regional waste disposal programs; and (3) the enactment
of improved and, so far as practical, uniform state and local laws governing solid
waste disposal. The New Jersey legislation will work at cross purposes with the
plans and goals EPA is striving to implement under the role given to it by the Solid
Waste Disposal Act. Moreover, the continuation of such a restriction would
establish an unfavorable precedent which, if followed by a substantial number of
other States, would render regional and interstate solutions to solid waste disposal
problems impossible to attain.
While the concerns of the several States as to the growing scarcity of landfill
disposal sites are understandable, restrictions on out-of-state wastes reflect a
narrow, parochial view without due regard to more significant problems and values
involved in the national policy in favor of regional planning for solid waste disposal
consistent with the achievement of environmental quality goals on a regional basis
in this and the related environmental areas in which EPA is making efforts to
combat water pollution under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 and air pollution under the Clean Air Act. Environmental planning in
the opinion of this Agency means regional planning and not restrictive legislation
by a jurisdictional entity in its own short-range self interest. This means that solid
waste processing and disposal facilities should be planned, designed and construct-
ed so as to serve "waste sheds" which may encompass more than one city or State,
and not merely the jurisdictional entity in which it is located or in which the waste
is generated.
Jurisdictional Statement at A57-58, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977). The
construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration is entitled to great
deference. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Udall v. Tallman,
380 U.S. 1 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
37. See note 25 supra.
38. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 70 (1941).
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6902 (West 1977).
40. Id. § 6902(8).
41. Id. § 6929.
and Congress has effectively preempted this area of solid waste han-
dling.42 The collection and disposal of nonhazardous solid waste con-
tinues to be primarily the function of state, regional, and local agen-
cies. 43 . The only obligation imposed by the Act is voluntary compliance
with guidelines established for regional waste plans. By restricting its
power to financial assistance, Congress has indicated an intent not to
preempt state authority. Therefore, a state's determination that the exclu-
sion of out-of-state waste is an emergency measure necessary to preserve
its irretrievable land resources" need not conflict with the long-term
federal objective of developing resource recovery systems. Intrastate re-
gions are large enough to support research, planning, and construction
efforts.
The national interest is best served by preserving the states as
experimental laboratories since the regulatory framework is already in
effect at a state level. 4" The imposition of interstate regions through
coercion is not conducive to efficient administration.' Waste disposal
facilities are an essential service traditionally performed by local govern-
ments. A plan that would permit one locality to export its responsibility to
another state may actually discourage a lasting solution because there is
no incentive to enter into an effective compact if the same result can be
achieved unilaterally.47 The use of federal funds to promote regional
plans located within a state is a satisfactory reconciliation of the federal
interest in developing alternatives to existing methods of land disposal4 8
and the state interest in excluding solid waste. 49 A finding of preemption
is premature until the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency, after consulting with state and regional authorities,' decides
that state exclusionary statutes interfere with the Agency's function under
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. 5'
42. Id. § 6921-31.
43. Id. § 6901(a)(4).
44. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 477, 348 A.2d 505, 517 (1975).
45. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505-06 (1957).
46. The common membership of New York and New Jersey in the Tri-State Transpor-
tation Commission did not deter New Jersey from excluding New York City's garbage. The
resistance to waste imports is based on the depletion of land resources. A compact to
develop a regional incineration facility as an alternative to landfills would have a greater
chance of success. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 463 n.8, 348 A.2d 505, 511 n.8 (1975).
47. Amicus curiae brief for Vermont and New Hampshire at 13, Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(b)(6) (West 1977).
49. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6912(a)(1) (West 1977).
51. When a federal agency is authorized to invoke an overriding federal power except
in certain prescribed situations and then leave the problem to traditional state control, the
existence of the federal authority to act should appear affirmatively and not rest on
inference alone. Connecticut Co. v. Power Comm'n, 324 U.S. 515, 532 (1945). See also
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), which held that
resolution of a potential conflict between state and federal regulations must await a concrete
dispute. The Florida Act, which subjected ships and terminal facilities to no-fault liability
III. The Burden on Commerce
Even though State embargoes of solid waste are not preempted by
federal legislation, they may unconstitutionally regulate the free flow of
products across state borders.52 Embargoes exist because residents of the
recipient communities object to the dissipation of their irretrievable land
resources and the creation of a health hazard. To determine whether these
local interests outweigh the federal power to regulate interstate com-
merce, it is first necessary to decide whether the transportation of waste is
an activity that warrants constitutional protection. If solid waste is an
article of commerce, then its exclusion from a state's territory may not
unreasonably burden the national interest in interstate commerce.
53
A. Solid Waste is an Article of Commerce
Solid waste is not entitled to the protection of the commerce clause54
unless it qualifies as a commercial commodity. Commerce has been
defined as "the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of
nations, in all its branches . . ... 55 The transportation of waste qual-
ifies as intercourse, but it must also be "for the purposes of trade."
5 6
Commercial character may be evidenced in either the nature of the
commodity transported or the components of transportation, such as the
service of collection and disposal 
7
1. Waste as a Merchantable Commodity. -Historically garbage
has not been a subject of trade or barter. By definition it has no value or
use beyond the charge levied for its speedy disposal. Arguably, the actual
commodity involved in the transportation of waste is the act of disposal,
whether by landfill or incineration. Collection is simply a service that
transfers the refuse from the point of collection to the point of disposal.
The disposal site does not move in commerce,5" but it does possess a
value based on alternative uses that is imputed to the waste.
Because value or merchantability is more a function of the market
than of the intrinsic character of the article, its measure will depend on the
for oil spill damages and cleanup costs, was not preempted by the Federal Water Quality
Improvement Act.
52. As urban areas exhaust available landfill sites, they will inevitably seek more
distant burial grounds located outside political boundaries. One long-range example is the
rail haul of garbage to abandoned strip mines. This plan would not only dispose of solid
waste, but would also aid in reclaiming gutted landscape. GRAD, supra note 10, § 4.01, at 13.
53. When the transportation of waste occurs wholly within one state, the local com-
munity must defer to the superior state authority and accept the garbage. Williams v.
Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 310 (1898); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 1244, 1270 (1974); Annot., 83
A.L.R.2d 799, 827 (1962).
54. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
55. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
56. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936).
57. Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 290 (1921).
58. Land sites may be articles of commerce for purposes of the Interstate Land Sales
Full Disclosure Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (1970).
peculiar state of technology and resources in each region. This proposi-
tion is clearly illustrated by the recent Supreme Court decision in Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. ,59 which upheld a Maryland program design-
ed to subsidize the business of processing abandoned automobile hulks.
The operation of the scheme gave Maryland processors an advantage over
appellee, a Virginia scrap processor. The Court concluded that the state
action did not unconstitutionally burden the flow of hulks across state
lines because Maryland had created an artificial market pursuant to a
legitimate effort to protect its environment. The commerce clause offers
protection to commerce that flourishes in a free market, not to commerce
that exists by the grace of a state subsidy program.
The increased participation of both federal and state governments in
the creation of new uses for waste components will increase the demand
and help create a market value for solid waste. Growing shortages of
virgin material and advances in technology will, therefore, combine to
make waste a commercial commodity.
(a) Federal legislation.-The Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act6' deliberately fosters the development of markets in recoverable
resources by raising the demand for recyclable materials contained in
waste matter. The Secretary of Commerce is charged with the duty to
stimulate the market for recovered materials61 by propagating informa-
tional guidelines on the substitutability of recovered material for virgin
materials.62 Specifically, the Secretary must act to
(1) identify the geographical location of existing or potential
markets for recovered materials;
(2) identify the economic and technical barriers to the use of
recovered materials; and
(3) encourage the development of new uses for recovered
materials.63
Federal procurement activity is exploited as a second stimulus to the
recovery of both energy and materials. Each procurement agency must
purchase items "composed of the highest percentage of recovered mate-
rials practicable consistent with maintaining a satisfactory level of com-
petition.' ' Agencies that presently use fossil fuel to generate energy and
59. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
60. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6951(2) (West 1977).
62. Id. § 6952. Congress designed the Act to separate the regulatory and promotional
functions related to discarded materials management. The regulatory, technical-assistance,
and planning functions are placed in the Environmental Protection Agency. The promo-
tional functions relating to resource recovery technology, the development of markets for
recovered materials, and descriptive indices are placed in the Department of Commerce.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 - Part 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 6238, 6242.
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6953 (West 1977). See GRAD, supra note 10, § 4.01, at 19.
64. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6962(c)(1)(A) (West 1977). The mandate is subject to the qualifica-
tions contained in subsections i-iii.
are capable of substituting recovered material or fuel derived from re-
covered material must do so. 6 5 The procurement of services must also be
carried on in a manner that maximizes energy and resource recovery.
66
The requirements for approval of state plans also promote the forma-
tion of long term contracts between communities and resource recovery
facilities for the supply of solid waste. 67 A guaranteed supply of material
lowers the risk of development and, therefore, encourages construction.
(b) State statutes.-The new wave of opportunity for economic
profit will sweep away many of the state blockades against the movement
of solid waste in commerce. Tennessee, for example, explicitly au-
thorizes the importation of solid waste from other states, subject only to
those handling standards that apply within the State. 68 The willingness to
accept out-of-state waste is explained by the requirement that such waste
must be processed in an approved system, which is defined as "a solid
waste disposal facility which has as its primary purpose the creation and
recovery of energy from solid waste and has as a secondary or incidental
purpose the recovery of recyclable commodities .... ."69 State and
federal purposes coincide. In contrast, the exclusionary statutes of Penn-
sylvania,70 Rhode Island, 71 and Vermont,7 2 which do not distinguish
waste that may be used for the production of new commodities or the
generation of energy from waste that has no further value, exclude
legitimate items of commerce.
73
2. The Service of Collection.-Since commercial intercourse also
encompasses the instrumentalities that transport waste, it is possible to
impute a value to non-renewable waste from the cost of collecting and
removing it. The refuse removal industry, whose activity is often inter-
state in character, exists because waste is nonmerchantable. It should not
be denied commerce clause protection against discriminatory state stat-
utes merely because the subject matter of its service lacks value. In
holding that defendant's activities violated section 1 of the Sherman
65. Id. § 6962(c)(1)(B).
66. Id. § 6962(f). Federal purchasing power alone cannot create major new markets
for secondary materials because expenditures represent only a small percentage of the
domestic market for most recyclable materials. The major impact of federal procurement
activity would come from the leadership role in determining the technological and economic
feasibility of substitution for use by local governments and private industry. Bryson, Solid
Waste and Resource Recovery, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1303-05 (E. Dolgin & T.
Guilbert eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Bryson].
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6943(5) (West 1977).
68. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-4104 (Supp. 1976).
69. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6-4108 (Supp. 1976).
70. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6007(f.1) (Purdon Supp. 1976).
71. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-46-6 (Supp. 1976).
72. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2204, 2205 (1975).
73. We therefore agree with the decision below, . . . that Ithe HMDC
regulations] cannot be sustained on the theory that no item of interstate commerce
is involved, as these regulations do clearly attempt to exclude from the HMD even
those types of wastes which may have some potentiality of useful renewal.
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451,
467, 348 A.2d 505, 513 (1975).
Antitrust Act ,74 the court in United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Remov-
al Ass'n 75 determined that the business of collecting and disposing of
refuse constituted interstate commerce. Appellants contended that be-
cause trash is a worthless commodity it could not be the subject of trade
or commerce under the Act. The court circumvented this argument by
declaring that "the real subject of 'trade or commerce' was not the
worthless debris, but the valuable service of removing and disposing of
it." ' 76 Because Congress exercised the full extent of its power over
interstate commerce in enacting the Sherman Act, 7 a finding that dispos-
al services are trade or commerce under its provisions also determines
that the industry's activities are interstate commerce for purposes of the
commerce clause. 78 An attempt to escape commerce clause limitations on
state action by categorizing waste as a nonmerchantable commodity fails
because it has either intrinsic value or a value that can be imputed from
the service of collection and disposal.
B. Balancing the State Interest Against the Burden on Commerce
The object of a state embargo on the importation of solid waste is not
to proscribe entrance per se, but to prohibit the permanent storage in
74. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970).
75. 242 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966).
76. 242 F. Supp. at 799.
77. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); United States v.
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 538 (1944).
78. The New Jersey Supreme Court qualified the applicability of the Pennsylvania
Refuse decision by examining the purposes for which congressional power was asserted.
The case pertained to the affirmative aspect of the commerce clause "to support some
exertion of federal control or regulation." In contrast, the constitutional challenge to state
exclusionary statutes deals with the negative implications of the commerce clause, "the
extent to which it may be invoked . .. to strike down or restrict state legislation."
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451,
469, 348 A.2d 505, 514 (1975).
The reach of the affirmative use to validate federal legislation is illustrated in Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). The "class of activities" test to determine which
activities have a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to justify a permissive exercise of
power was applied to the prohibition of loan sharking, an area traditionally limited to the
exercise of state police power. Congress may regulate a class of activities without proof that
a particular intrastate activity has an effect on commerce. Id. at 152.
When the commerce clause is asserted negatively to invalidate a state regulation there
must be a balancing of both the state and federal interests and an examination of whether the
infringement on commerce is rationally related to the state purpose before the national
power over commerce prevails. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76
(1945). See notes 119-32 and accompanying text infra. Congress undoubtedly has the power
to regulate the movement of waste in interstate commerce on the basis that disposal activity
is essential to interstate manufacturing, Mitchell v. Dooley Bros., 286 F.2d 40 (Ist Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 911 (1911); Brennan v. Metropolitan Trash, Inc., 513 F.2d 1324
(10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975), that wastes are actually a different form
of material that at one time moved in interstate commerce, United States v. Sullivan, 332
U.S. 689 (1948); H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 - PART 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6238, 6247, or that wastes aggravate the pollution of
air and water resources. Until Congress asserts its power, state control over the movement
of waste is subject only to a rational basis test. Cf. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220
U.S. 45, 57-58 (1911).
landfills that are located within its borders. If all waste could be returned
safely to the stream of commercial activity by recycling or conversion
into energy, existing bans would fall spontaneously. According to this
construction of the problem, the constitutional issue is whether a state
may exclude solid waste to preserve the health and welfare of its citizens
and to conserve its land resources. The criteria for determining the
validity of state statutes that affect the free flow of commerce are outlined
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local
purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and' on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact ot
interstate activities.
79
A court will not conduct a burden analysis unless it is convinced that the
regulation is not discriminatory on its face, there is a legitimate local
interest, and the burden is only incidental to the furtherance of this local
interest. 80
I. Evenhandedness.-The purpose of the commerce clause was to
prevent the erection of trade barriers that would impede the free flow of
raw materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of
supply and demand.8 In the words of Mr. Justice Cardozo, the Constitu-
tion "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states
must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division." 2 The commerce clause directs
its sanctions against economic discrimination designed to secure a local
benefit to the detriment of neighboring states and not against legitimate
exercises of police power reserved to the states.8 3 A state's exercise of its
79. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); accord, A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
80. A weighing process may be inappropriate in cases of non-comparable benefit and
injury, such as costs to railroads against the limbs of workers. Fireman v. Chicago, R.I. &
P.R. Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968); accord, American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control
Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691, 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (comparing blight on the landscape and
injury to children's feet against economic loss to the bottling industry).
81. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976).
82. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
83. This distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from
menaces to their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers
emanate from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or
constrict the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply
rooted in both our history and our law.
Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949). The nebulous line between the
constitutional purpose of preserving public health and the discriminatory promotion of local
industries by restricting competition under the guise of economic welfare is traced in the
milk regulation cases. Compare Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison. 340 U.S. 349 (1951);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949); A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976), in which state regulation was struck
police power to exclude out-of-state waste is not a disguised device to
bestow a competitive advantage on some local industry. On the contrary,
local landfill operators will actually suffer harm from a loss of customers.
One court dismissed the motive of discrimination as follows:
Nor has there been discrimination, at least in the economic
sense. In examining this point we must look to the ends sought
to be achieved. Here the purpose of the legislation is to protect
the inhabitants and vital resources of New Jersey, not to im-
pose economic barriers or create commercial restrictions. Nor
is there any real or significant discrimination in favor of local
collectors. Refuse amassed by them outside the State may not
be brought into New Jersey. Conversely, residents of other
states are free to collect and dump within the state.84
2. Legitimate Local Purposes.-State legislatures are granted a
broad power to decide community values free from the homogenizing
constraints of federal dictates. 85 Although the Supreme Court is the final
arbiter of competing state and national interests under the commerce
clause, 8 6 the state's determination of the public interest in health and
welfare should be accorded deference.
8 7
(a) Protection of health and welfare.--" [T]he power of the State
to take steps to prevent the introduction or spread of disease, although
interstate and foreign commerce are involved . . . is beyond ques-
tion. "88 The Supreme Court has rationalized the quarantine power89 by
removing commerce clause protection from the contagion. "Such articles
are not merchantable; they are not legitimate subjects of trade or com-
merce. They may be rightly outlawed as intrinsically and directly the
immediate sources and causes of destruction to human health and life.' -90
The quarantine power also applies to articles that are not innately harm-
ful, but whose introduction into a state will aggravate an existing danger
to public health. The Supreme Court in Compagnie Francaise de Naviga-
tion a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health9' sustained the State's
down, with Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939), in
which the state purpose was a permissible burden on commerce.
84. Hackensack Meadowland Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 475, 348 A.2d 505, 517 (1975).
85. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951).
86. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
87. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
88. Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 406 (1913); accord, Oregon Washington Co.
v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87 (1926).
89. The power to quarantine is concomitant to the Inspection Clause, U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 10, cl. 2.
90. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 60 (1915) (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry.'
Co., 125 U.S. 465 (1888)). Quarantine laws have been upheld as applied to animals, Kimmish
v. Ball, 129 U.S. 217 (1889); Smith v. St. Louis & S. Ry., 181 U.S. 248 (1901); food
products, Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925); and cosmetics, Bourjois
Inc. v. Chapman, 301 U.S. 183 (1937). But see Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 473
(1877).
91. 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
power to prohibit the entrance of any person, whether immune or not,
into a locality infected with a dangerous disease. The power to regulate
may vest in the local government the power to exclude absolutely. A
court will not void the exercise of discretion by a state government based
on mere conjecture; abuse of discretion must be concretely demon-
strated .92
Congress has explicitly noted the potential danger to public health
inherent in land disposal of wastes.
(b)(2) disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste in or
on the land without careful planning and management can pre-
sent a danger to human health and the environment;
(b)(4) open dumping is particularly harmful to health,
contaminates drinking water from underground and surface
supplies, and pollutes the air and the land. .... 93
The dangers of air and water pollution, fire and disease carried by animals
from a sanitary landfill arise from a combination of the nature of garbage
and its concentration at the disposal site.
Garbage or refuse is unsightly, smelly, attracts flies and ro-
dents, and is a potential fire hazard. It is a prime source of
disease and contamination. . . . [N]o matter how carefully
regulated, garbage dumps present some hazard to a community,
the degree of hazard being directly related to the amount of
garbage dumped. 4
Restrictions on the influx of garbage from outside the state reduce the
volume of waste and therefore promote the state interest in preserving the
public health.
The police power is not restricted to the exclusion of disease-
carrying materials. The growing concern for environmental degradation
has prompted the Supreme Court to state recently,
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench,
and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family
values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and
clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. 9
The Oregon Legislature has confronted the economic, aesthetic, and
environmental consequences of one aspect of the solid waste problem-
litter from disposable beverage containers. The statute, which promotes
the use of returnable beverage containers by prohibiting cans with pull
tops and requiring deposits on bottles, was a valid method to attain the
local benefit of reduced litter and injuries caused by discarded pull tops.
96
The financial burden on commerce, although not a total ban, was exten-
sive: the market for metal containers would be substantially reduced,
92. Id. at 392-93.
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 (West 1977).
94. Shaw v. Byram Tp., 86 N.J. Super. 598, 602, 207 A.2d 570, 572 (1965).
95. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974).
96. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Or. Ct. App.
1973); accord, Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679(1975); Anchor
Hocking Glass Corp. v. Barber, 118 Vt. 206, 105 A.2d 271 (1954).
brewers would be required to prepare a new package for the Oregon
market, and bottle manufacturers would lose a substantial volume of
sales. 97
Exclusion of detergents with a high phosphate content has also been
found to be a permissible burden on commerce. 98 In Proctor & Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 the ordinance had a considerable impact on
national producers of detergents, who sustained losses in sales totalling
over five million dollars and were forced to alter their interstate system of
distribution. 00 The court concluded that phosphates, the excluded com-
modity, "are not harmful to most humans and are even added to water by
some communities for the purpose of softening." ' 0 ' The ban on phos-
phorous is designed to slow down the growth of nuisance algae, which
cause unpleasant odor and a bad taste in drinking water. The embargo of
an intrinsically safe and useful product of commerce was a proper means
to attain the legitimate goal of preserving the public health. Clearly, a
state's desire to reduce the amount of solid waste deposited in local
landfills is an equally permissible objective.
(b) Conservation of land resources. -The state, the ultimate own-
er of its land resources," 2 has a right and duty as trustee for its citizens to
preserve the quality of its land and the possibility for diverse uses in the
future. The exclusion of solid waste is directly related to this purpose.
Sanitary landfills conducted on virgin land forever ruin the
possibility of preserving the site for conservation. Additionally,
such landfill operations can have an adverse effect on the
ecological balance of the surrounding area. A sanitary landfill
operation also has severe limiting effects on future development
of the property. Problems of settlement, gas generation, and
fires make it difficult to construct structures on former landfill
sites. 103
Congressional findings support this view. "[L]and is too valuable a
national resource to be needlessly polluted by discarded materials
",104
A state may adopt reasonable regulations to prevent the waste of its
97. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 517 P.2d 691 (Or. Ct. App.
1973).
98. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975); Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971);
Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Erie County, 68 Misc. 2d 704, 327 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1971).
99. 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), reversing Soap &
Detergent Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 357 F. Supp. 44 (N.D. Il1. 1973).
100. 509 F.2d at 73.
101. Id.
102. I R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 158 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL].
103. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth. v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n,
120 N.J. Super. 118, 122, 293 A.2d 426, 428 (1972) (emphasis in original).
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(b)(1) (West 1977). For a background discussion of the mechan-
ics of operating a sanitary landfill and the problems they generate, see Comment, Solid
Waste Disposal by Means of Sanitary Landfill, 36 ALB. L. REv. 632 (1972).
resources, 1 5 but it has no power to prohibit the export of a natural
resource in which an individual can acquire an absolute property right.' 0
The rule has no application to resources in which a state has an underlying
property right as trustee because an individual possesses only a qualified
ownership.'0 7 "A State may care for its own in utilizing the bounties of
nature within her borders because it has technical ownership of such
bounties .... .. "" The public trust doctrine'09 was applied in Hudson
County Water Co. v. McCarter 110 to restrict the transportation of water
from any body of fresh water wholly within New Jersey to a point outside
the State. Analogizing the ordinance to a state's power to prohibit the
taking of wild animals outside its borders, Mr. Justice Holmes stated,
It is sometimes difficult to fix boundary stones between the
private right of property and the police power . . . . But it is
recognized that the state as quasi-sovereign and representative
of the interests of the public has a standing in court to protect
the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory,
irrespective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of
land most immediately concerned."'
105. Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179 (1950).
106. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). The holding of the natural gas cases prohibits a state from
compelling the retention within its boundaries of natural gas once it is severed from the
ground and reduced to possession, even if the supply is no longer sufficient to satisfy local
needs. Natural gas belongs to the class of resources, including coal, oil and timber, that are
unevenly distributed across the nation and for which a market demand has been established.
The consequences of embargo would violate the purpose of the commerce clause to form a
common market.
The welfare . ..of each state is made greater by a division of its resources,
natural and created, with every other state, and those of every other state with it.
This was the purpose, as it is the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911). The natural gas cases are
distinguishable from a state's attempt to protect its environment against the importation of
solid waste because the underlying purpose was to preserve and exploit a resource for
selfish economic gain. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. -Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary
Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451,477, 348 A.2d 505, 518 (1975); see Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S.
52 (1915).
107. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1877). The Court in Geer justified the interference with commerce by finding that the
state's wild game could never become articles of commerce. Because the state may control
the killing and ownership of game, it can effectively confine the use of its resources to
internal commerce for the benefit of its citizens. Private ownership of wild animals is
conditioned on their retention within the state. A different result obtains when the state
authorizes the export of its public trust resources and attempts to qualify their movement
for the benefit of local industry. Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
108. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
109. For a discussion of public trust law prospects as a sword to protect the environ-
ment, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471 (1970). Historically, the scope of the doctrine was
limited to the public domain below the low water mark on the margin of the sea and the great
lakes, the water over those lands, the waters within navigable streams, and land within
public parks. Professor Sax advocates the extension of the doctrine to protect all public
interests regardless of the context in which they are asserted. Id. at 556. See generally R.
POWELL, supra note 109, 159, 160, 163.
110. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
I1. Id. at 355.
For a discussion of the continuing validity of McCarter in light of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.
Implicitly the public trust doctrine may be extended to preserve the state's
territory itself.'
12
The issue of exclusion condenses to a determination of whether one
state must sacrifice its irretrievable resource of land and its potential for
growth for the present growth and conservation of a sister state. 13 Unlike
the natural resources of oil and gas, no state is uniquely endowed with
land that is suitable for use as sanitary landfill. Because land is fixed in
location and cannot be severed and removed, 14 it has always been
subject to local rather than national control. "' Similarly the generation of
waste and the service of disposal are matters related to local habitation" 16
that affect the governmental concerns of regional planning, zoning,
aesthetics, and environmental standards. Undoubtedly a state has the
right to qualify ownership of its property"I7 through the use of zoning and
eminent domain. " " The limitation of land use to the disposal of domestic
garbage is likewise a permissible exercise of these powers.
3. Reasonable Means.-Once a legitimate local interest in health
and conservation is recognized, it must then be determined "whether the
means of regulation chosen are reasonably adapted to the end sought."" 19
The nature of a court's investigation into the reasonableness of a statute is
presently unclear' 20 as a result of divergent guidelines in Supreme Court
case law. The Court in South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros. 121 reversed the lower court because it conducted an evidentiary
Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35 (1966), see Comment, "It's Our
Water!'--Can Wyoming Constitutionally Prohibit the Exportation of State Waters, 10
LAND AND WATER L. REV. 119, 132 (1975).
112. Mr. Justice Holmes, in the context of a suit by Georgia to prevent deleterious
fumes from blowing across its borders, has stated,
The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage
to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This is a suit by a
state for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the state
has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth
and air within its domain. It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be
stripped of their forests and its inhabitants shall breathe pure air.
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
113. The irony in the Philadelphia-New Jersey dispute is that Philadelphia is prohibited
from dumping its waste in neighboring Pennsylvania communities but seeks to compel New
Jersey to accept its waste by invoking the commerce clause. Philadelphia is actually
usurping the benefits of New Jersey's regionalized treatment of waste disposal. Brief for
Appellee at 33, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
114. See note 106 supra.
115. Amicus Curiae brief for Vermont and New Hampshire at 8, Philadelphia v. New
Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
116. See note 21 supra.
117. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
118. Scottsdale v. Municipal Court of Tempe, 90 Ariz. 393, 368 P.2d 637 (1962); People
v. North Shore Sanitary Dist., 132 Ill. App. 2d 854, 270 N.E.2d 133 (1971). The power of
eminent domain is never extraterritorial. Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472
(1924). Therefore a state has no right to dictate land use within a neighboring state.
119. South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938).
120. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 75 (7th Cir. 1974);
Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451,
474, 348 A.2d 505, 517 (1973).
121. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
analysis of the relation between statutes that prohibited trucks of a certain
length and width from using the State's highways and the actual harm
caused to the highway. The Court instead conferred a presumption of
validity on the legislature's determination of the public interest.
Since the adoption of one weight or width regulation, rather
than another, is a legislative not a judicial choice, its constitu-
tionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial
scales the merits of the legislative choice and rejecting it if the
weight of evidence presented in court appears to favor a differ-
ent standard. 2
A court should examine a factual record only to determine whether the
legislative choice is without rational basis.
123
In contrast, the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 124 after
finding legitimate ends and appropriate means, engaged in a balancing
test to determine whether the local benefit actually outweighed the burden
on commerce. The Court asserted its right as final arbiter of state and
federal interests to hold an evidentiary analysis.' 2 5 Reasonableness, the
Court held, is not an absolute standard, but depends on whether the
increment to public safety is "so slight or problematical as not to out-
weigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from
interferences which seriously impede it .... ,,126 The Court has also
inquired into the possibility of less restrictive alternatives that will ade-
quately protect the state interest, but cause less interference with inter-
state commerce.
1 2 7
Recent decisions' 28 have questioned the continued necessity of
weighing the burden on commerce against the benefit to the state, espe-
cially in light of Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman & Engineman v.
Chicago, R.L & R.R.R. 129 One court 30 has resolved the ambiguity by
permitting a factual determination of whether the statute will accomplish
122. Id. at 191.
123. Id. at 192.
124. 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
125. Id. at 771. The decision distinguished Barnwell by comparing the nature of the
power asserted and the subject matter regulated. Highways are built, owned, and main-
tained by the state and do not require national uniformity in regulation. Compare Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
126. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 776 (1945). This is the candid
balancing approach referred to in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
127. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). Compare Breard v. Alexandria,
341 U.S. 622 (1951). Dean Milk is distinguishable from a legitimate state attempt to conserve
the health and resources of its citizens because the local milk regulation was discriminatory;
therefore an exploration of reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives was justified.
128. See note 120 supra.
129. 393 U.S. 129 (1968). In this case the district court concluded that the safety value
of the "full crew" laws did not justify the burden on interstate commerce. In reversing, the
Supreme Court rejected the analysis of the lower court.
We think it plain that in striking down the full-crew laws on this basis, the District
Court indulged in a legislative judgment wholly beyond its limited authority to
review State legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Id. at 136. The Oregon court in American Can interpreted the decision by focusing on the
impropriety of weighing noncomparable items. See note 17 supra.
130. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69, 76 (7th Cir. 1974).
its stated objectives, but prohibiting a weighing of the local interest once
the reasonableness of the legislation is established."'3 On the question of
how much weight should be accorded the legislature's determination that
the chosen means will accomplish the objectives, the court concluded,
It is our view, however, that if the burden on interstate com-
merce is slight, and the area of legislation is one that is properly
of local concern, the means chosen to accomplish this end
should be deemed reasonably effective unless the party attack-
ing the legislation demonstrates the contrary by clear and con-
vincing proof. If it is determined that this presumption should
be applied, no further balancing need be undertaken.
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Whether the exclusion of out-of-state waste from landfills actually
advances the preservation of health and environmental welfare is a factual
determination dependent on local variables such as disposal technology
and soil characteristics.
Generally there is no qualitative difference between solid waste
collected outside the state and that which is generated within. 133 There-
fore, the state interest in health advanced by an exclusionary statute is the
reduction of water contamination, air pollution, poisoning, and fires' 34 in
proportion to the volume of waste that is excluded. The imported waste
affects the extent, rather than the nature, of the danger to health caused by
waste collected within the state. If no health problem exists, the exclusion
of solid waste is not a reasonable means to justify the exercise of police
power. In most cases, the addition of' waste collected in other states will
have a negligible affect on public health. The increment in New Jersey,
for example, is only eight percent. 1
35
A more cogent rationale for the exclusion of waste is conservation of
irretrievable land resources. 36 The New Jersey situation illustrates the
impending crisis for areas of concentrated population. Both New York
and Philadelphia presently transport their garbage into New Jersey land-
fills. By 1973 approximately twenty percent of the waste deposited in the
131. This assumes the court has determined the statute does not discriminate in ad-
vancing the local interest and that the burden on commerce is incidental.
132. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69,76(7th Cir. 1974); accord,
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 152 (1902).
133. A state must rely on the standards for collection and handling of waste in sister
states as long as they provide comparable protection to the public. Minnesota v. Barber, 136
U.S. 313 (1890); A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
134. H.R. REP. No. 94-1461 - PART II, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in [19761
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6323, 6325.
135. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505, 510 (1975). But see Proctor & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509
F.2d 69, 80-81 (7th Cir. 1974). The soap manufacturers failed in their burden to present clear
and convincing evidence that the ordinance was unrelated to the legitimate objective of
eliminating nuisance algae. The court looked beyond the immediate absence of impact to the
possibility that the ban on phosphates would be relevant to reducing algae in the future. The
legislature is entitled to take the initial step to save water supplies from eutrophication and
any doubt concerning the efficacy of its action should he resolved in favor of the statute.
136. If the land designated as a landfill is suitable for no other use, then this justifica-
tion loses its force. See note 52 supra.
Hackensack Meadowlands came from outside the State. This percentage
acquires added significance because the total life of existing landfills in
the northern part of the State is only three years. The desire to conserve
ecologically sensitive areas such as floodplains, wetlands, and state-
owned public trust tidelands has restricted planning for future landfills
and may curtail the operation of existing ones. 137 The State has recog-
nized that alternatives to land disposal are needed, but until they are
developed the exclusion is a true emergency measure intended to forestall
the depletion of land.
Nor can it seriously be urged that the means employed were not
suitable to the end sought to be attained. Less than total exclu-
sion of solid waste generated outside New Jersey would have
been of no avail. Even the means that have been adopted-
apparently the best available--offer no certainty of providing
more than much needed time within which to devise by tech-
nological effort and ingenuity a satisfactory ultimate
solution. 3 '
It should be evident that a health and conservation justification for
exclusion applies only to those wastes that presently cannot be recycled or
converted into energy. Thus, an examination of reasonable alternatives to
land disposal is appropriate if a state has made no effort to comply with
the national policy to plan for and apply new disposal technology as
expressed in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.13 9 Congres-
sional initiative has widened the range of alternatives to land disposal,
and a state that is unreasonably delinquent in following the federal lead
may be charged with failing to pursue available options. A statute that
excludes waste for further processing into new commodities or for incin-
eration has only a slight relation to accomplishing legitimate objectives
and is clearly unconstitutional.
4. Incidental Burden.-The opposition to any embargo arises
from the possibility of retaliation and isolation, which frustrates the
purpose of the commerce clause to establish a common market. "To what
consequences does such power tend? If one State has it, all States have it;
embargo may be retaliated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at
state lines."' Superficially, the reasoning of Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia141 appears applicable to the embargo of solid waste. West
Virginia initially possessed an abundance of natural gas and encouraged
137. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 461, 348 A.2d 505, 510 (1975). The public trust doctrine has also been asserted to
prevent the construction of a ski slope from garbage on land within a public park. Stephen-
son v. County of Monroe, 4 ENvIR. L. REp. 20364 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). See note 109
supra.
138. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 475, 348 A.2d 505, 517 (1975).
139 See notes 25-51 and accompanying text supra.
140. Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
141. 262 U.S. 553 (1922).
the construction of an interstate distribution system to profit from its sale.
After neighboring states had come to rely on this source, the supply
dwindled and West Virginia attempted to retain the natural gas exclu-
sively for local needs. The action to withdraw gas from an established
current of commerce, ostensibly for conservation and local welfare, was
unconstitutional.' 4 2 By closing its borders to the importation of waste, a
state cuts off an established flow of commerce, but the dislocation is not
nearly as drastic as the disruption of an established interstate pipeline
system. The New Jersey court concluded,
That burden is slight indeed. There is nothing to indicate that
adequate alternatives are not available in both New York and
Pennsylvania. The City of Yonkers has access to the Croton
dump in New York at a modest increase in cost of five dollars
per ton. Philadelphia's stated alternatives are either to install
adequate air pollution devices in their existing incinerators or to
establish new landfill sites outside the city, which would require
the purchase of additional disposal trucks. When balanced
against the dangers to public health and to the environment that
this legislation seeks to avert, these relatively small costs and
modest inconveniences seem minor indeed.
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The magnitude of the burden increases substantially when renewable
waste rather than garbage destined for a landfill is regulated. In contrast
to land disposal, the recovery of materials and energy from waste affects
the national interest and is better adapted to a national solution.
t4
Resource recovery reduces the nation's reliance on foreign energy and
materials and therefore lessens the balance of trade deficit. The construc-
tion of waste management facilities also generates useful employment.
Since Congress has sponsored the development of markets for recovered
materials, 45 any state statute that interrupts the movement of waste
suitable for reuse significantly burdens the functioning of such markets.
Optimal regional planning, experimentation, and construction can be
administered within the confines of state boundaries, but the recovery of
resources and the exploitation of high cost technology, such as the
generation of electricity from waste, t'4 demands the free movement of
certain waste across political boundaries.
IV. State Statutes in Constitutional Perspective
Statutes that restrict the importation of solid waste can be arranged
on a continuum, beginning with regulations that are motivated only by an
interest in preserving health and ending with regulations that are clearly
142. See note 106 supra.
143. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 475-76, 348 A.2d 505,518 (1975). The "relatively small" costs actually amount to a
$7.5 million yearly increase for the City of Yonkers and a $100 million incineration facility
for Philadelphia. Brief for Appellant at 70, Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 430 U.S. 141 (1977).
144. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
145. See notes 60-67 and accompanying text supra.
146. See note 10 supra.
unrelated to effecting a valid state objective. At one end of the continuum
are the statutes of Illinois and Louisiana. The Illinois statute subjects
waste entering the state to the same handling requirements that apply to
internal waste.' 47 The reasoning of Minnesota v. Barber"4 indicates that
such intervention is permissible. Louisiana directs its ban against indus-
trial waste "if it is reasonably foreseeable that the health of any member
of the public or animal life will be endangered thereby." 49 The purpose
to preserve local health is openly stated on the face of the legislation. The
effect of Louisiana's statute may be cancelled by the standards estab-
lished for hazardous waste in the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act. 150 The state, however, may impose more stringent requirements in
the interest of public health.
51
Maine' 5 2 and New Hampshire 53 exclude all waste subject to an
exception for substances that may be used for the production of new
commodities. Massachusetts allows a similar exception for waste that
enters "under a recycling program whereby at least sixty percent of such
rubbish, garbage, or refuse is scheduled to be recycled.""' While the
common objective of these statutes-the protection of existing disposal
methods from depletion-is constitutionally acceptable, the statutes are
unreasonable if the internal waste is disposed of by means that neither
endanger health nor consume land resources.
The legislatures of both Delaware and New Jersey have vested the
ultimate decision to bar waste in an administrative body. Delaware
requires a permit from the Board of Health before any refuse may be
brought into the state. The purpose of this permit system is to control the
place and method of disposal. 55 The New Jersey statute, by comparison,
imposes an absolute prohibition "until the commissioner shall determine
that such action can be permitted without endangering the public health,
safety and welfare and has promulgated regulations permitting and reg-
ulating the treatment and disposal of such waste in this State.' 1 56 A
denial of all permits or a refusal to formulate regulations would amount to
an unconstitutional ban.
A federal court, however, will refrain from deciding the constitu-
tional issue until state action under the statute is actually in conflict with
the commerce clause. Thus, a state can save a statutory program by
147. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. II 1I/2, § 1021 (Smith-Hurd 1977).
148. 136 U.S. 313 (1890). See note 133 supra.
149. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40: 1299-36B (West Supp. 1977).
150. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6921-31 (West 1977).
151. Id. § 6929.
152. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (Supp. 1976).
153. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147: 30-f (Supp. 1973).
154. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 17A (West Supp. 1977).
155. DEL. CODE tit. 16, § 1701 (Supp. 1976).
156. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13: 119- 1I 10 (West Supp. 1976). Garbage destined to become
swine feed is exempted from the ban.
clarifying its operation through amendment, a state court decision, or the
issuance of administrative guidelines. 157 New Jersey, for example, has
issued regulations that exempt waste for recycling, energy generation,
and industrial waste destined for treatment or recovery in a registered
disposal facility. ' 8 The Supreme Court of New Jersey recognized that the
statute must be read together with the regulations formed under it. 15 9 As
long as the discretionary action of an administrative agency is rationally
related to legitimate state objectives, the state may successfully defend a
constitutional challenge.
At the other end of the continuum, the statutes of Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Vermont are unconstitutional attempts to restrict the
movement of solid waste in interstate commerce. The Pennsylvania
statute,' 6 without justification, erects a retaliatory embargo against any
state that excludes Pennsylvania's waste. This is precisely the type of
action that the commerce clause intended to prevent: 16 1 a state may not
use the threat of isolation as a weapon to force other states into desirable
reciprocal agreements. 162 Pennsylvania bases its action not on the pres-
ence of either a health or an environmental menace, but on an irrational
reaction to the legitimate decisions of neighboring states. Neither the
object nor the means are lawful. Rhode Island 163 and Vermont' 64 do not
qualify their absolute embargo of solid waste. 65 These restrictions obvi-
ously exceed the measures necessary for protecting the state interest
because there is no provision for the entrance of harmless or even
economically useful material. Therefore, the burden on commerce is
impermissible.
V. Conclusion
State and federal legislation on the subject of solid waste share a
commitment to safeguarding the public health and welfare, the purity of
the environment, and aesthetic standards. A state's embargo policy does
not conflict with the federal program of establishing regional waste
management systems, but merely reflects the different constraints that act
upon the respective decision-making bodies. States face the certain pros-
pect of an ever-increasing volume of discarded materials and realize that
157. Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1119-21
(1974).
158. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68
N.J. 451, 457-58, 348 A.2d 505, 508 (1975).
159. Id. at 468, 348 A.2d at 513. This interpretation is binding in any subsequent
adjudication. Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455 (1905).
160. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6007 (f.1) (Purdon 1977).
161. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). See note 140 and
accompanying text supra.
162. A&P Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
163. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-46-6 (Supp. 1976).
164. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2204 (1975).
165. Vermont will allow reciprocal importation of waste. Id. § 2205(2).
disposal by low-cost landfill cannot accommodate the stream of waste
indefinitely. 66 The rational solution from a state's viewpoint is to reduce
total waste by reserving the existing disposal capacity for local use. The
federal government, because it commands superior financial and technic-
al resources, can initiate an investigation of optimal waste management
techniques and then implement them on a local level. This approach seeks
to minimize the disposal problem by reducing the total volume of waste.
Resource conservation entails shifting consumption and packaging pat-
terns away from present throw-away consumer habits. 167 Resource recov-
ery contemplates the extraction of materials and energy from waste before
they are lost forever by burial in a landfill. The major obstacle to resource
recovery is the absence of stable markets for recovered materials. Prices
competitive with virgin materials and established markets will alleviate
the prejudice against recycled material. 168 For the remainder of waste that
cannot be returned to the productive cycle, the federal government has
proposed standards for handling hazardous waste' 69 and the operation of
sanitary landfills 7 ° that are intended to reduce environmental degrada-
tion.
Because the national solution is optimal, it will subsume parochial
state responses to the problem of solid waste. The key to a comprehensive
approach is the establishment of regional waste management au-
thorities.' 7 1 The region, spurred by federal financial incentives, under-
takes initial studies, receives information from similar regional efforts,
plans and finally implements a coordinated resource recovery and waste
disposal system. 172 The end result is a cost-efficient region that satisfies
the local interest in conserving land, the national interest in recovering
resources, and the common interest in preserving the health and environ-
ment of all citizens.
Federal assistance does not remove the ultimate authority of a state
to protect the health and resources of its citizens. Until regional plans are
widely applied, the state has the power to exclude waste as an emergency
measure. After the transition to optimal regional resource recovery and
disposal is effected, the dangers to health and the environment will be
minimized, but the justification for exclusion remains. No state is entitled
to usurp the benefits of rational waste management that accrue from the
planning efforts of regions within sister states, unless the region specifi-
166. By the end of the decade fifty of the nation's largest cities will exhaust their
landfill capacity. H.R. REP. No. 94-1461 - PART 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG3. & AD. NEws 6238, 6247.
167. Bryson, supra note 66, at 1314.
168. See notes 60-67 and accompanying text supra.
169. See note 42 supra.
170. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6944-6945 (West 1977).
171. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
172. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6941 (West 1977).
cally encompasses several states. 173 Federal financial and technical assist-
ance is uniformly available, and the state that fails to seize the common
advantage and develop regional plans contravenes the national policy in
favor of resource recovery and violates its duty to protect the health and
environment of its citizens. The rationalization of waste management
does not demand the abdication of state autonomy.
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